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ABSTRACT
Researchers examining regulatory enforcement have found that
enforcement styles tend to be contextually determined in Western
countries, which has resulted in a divergence in regulatory approach at
both the national and local levels. Given the dearth of regulation
research in non-democratic regimes, this paper makes an initial
attempt to ﬁll the gap by studying the impact of regional variations in
regulatory enforcement in China. Accordingly, the effects of external
support and organizational factors on the preferences for enforcement
styles of environmental ofﬁcials in three Chinese regions were
examined. It was found that the strength of these inﬂuences on
enforcement style dimensions is more variable than was anticipated.
Generally, the patterns of relationships for Guangzhou and Chengdu
were similar, while those for Dalian appear to reﬂect its unique
environmental, economic and political conditions. Public support
appears to promote several dimensions of enforcement style (i.e.,
education, prioritization, coercion) in Guangzhou and Chengdu;
however, in Dalian the inﬂuence of government was greater than that
of public support. The effects of internal factors were even more
variable and probably reﬂect unique characteristics and priorities
within each agency. Overall, the results suggest that caution is
warranted when interpreting current ﬁndings about China that have
used samples from a single region and that enforcement agency
directors in nondemocratic regimes must take into account a complex
array of contextual factors in attempting to promote a particular style
of enforcement.
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Although its citizenry historically maintained small individual ecolo-
gical footprints, the extent of environmental degradation during the
period of ‘‘Great Leap Forward’’ and ‘‘Cultural Revolution’’ was sub-
stantial due to the interaction of several factors. First, there was heavy
population density in many regions. Second, huge public works projects
were undertaken with little or no environmental or social forethought
(e.g., dam construction, factory sitings, coal and mineral extraction).
Third, many utilities and other factories utilized heavily polluting tech-
nologies. Finally, public awareness of this loss of natural capital was
restricted and those directly affected had little recourse.
Unfortunately, the market reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping have
mostly served to exacerbate this destruction of natural capital (Smil,
1993; Edmonds, 1994). The impressive gains in gross domestic product
(GDP) have substantially enlarged the ecological footprints of China’s
urban population, while industrial production is now serving vast export
markets. The result has been a huge increase in energy demand and
pollutants, and a staggering accumulation of solid wastes. As a con-
sequence, China now faces a growing litany of environmental problems
embracing such broadly ranging issues as chromosome damage from
toxic metals, desertiﬁcation, soil erosion, macro- and micro-climatic
changes, collapsed ﬁsh stocks, loss of biodiversity, debilitating levels of
air pollution in many urban areas, acid rain, and water shortages.
Since the mid-90s authorities have made earnest efforts to mitigate
this damage (Lo and Leung, 1998). Numerous new laws and regula-
tions have recently been passed (Palmer, 1998), various market-based
approaches have been introduced (i.e., the reduction of subsidies, user
fees, and tradable permitting schemes), and educational and awareness
programs have been launched. So far, however, the results of these
efforts have been mixed. On the one hand, it is clear that in speciﬁc
contexts, the command and control political structure in China can
lead to a rapid implementation of programs (e.g., the elimination of
harmful two-cycle microtaxis or ‘‘miandi’’ and the closure of high pollut-
ing factories in Beijing). At the same time, a number of institutional
and contextual obstacles seriously limit the frequency of such success
stories, especially in terms of nation-wide improvement. Sims (1999)
highlights China’s ‘‘fragmented’’ bureaucracy, political obstruction of
the more powerful ministries, and a shortage of resources as some of
the primary culprits. As a result, government efforts alone are expected
to have less impact on most environmental problems than might have
been hoped for (Lo and Tang, 1994; Ross, 1988; Sinkule and Ortolano,
1995; Tang, Lo, Lo and Cheung, 1997). Indeed, in most cases, areas
of real progress have been overwhelmed by economic growth.
Although much has been written about regulatory enforcement in
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China (e.g., Chan, Wong, Lo and Cheung, 1995; Sinkule and Ortolano,
1995; Sims, 1999; Lo and Leung, 2000; Ma and Ortolano, 2000), two
factors have been largely overlooked in the discussion on how to
improve China’s environment. First, most studies have focused on the
policy- or organization-level, thereby overlooking the enforcement ofﬁ-
cials themselves. Because the enforcement ofﬁcials are the foot soldiers
in this ‘‘war’’, they must adapt their own personalities and preferences
to local conditions in order to obtain compliance from a reluctant (and
often cash-strapped) enterprise. The second factor involves the likeli-
hood of regional variations across regions in China. To date, there have
been very few empirical studies that have drawn data from multiple
regions. Because of the power of local inﬂuences on environmental
regulation, we suspect that it may be much more difﬁcult to generalize
ﬁndings than may be widely assumed.
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship
among various proposed inﬂuences on the enforcement style dimen-
sions of environmental enforcement ofﬁcers in mainland China. In par-
ticular, the inﬂuences of external support for environmental protection
(i.e., government and public support) and various organizational inﬂu-
ences (role clarity, supervisory support and resource adequacy) are
examined. Although the level of analysis in this study is at the level of
enforcement ofﬁcials, the generalizability of these inﬂuences across
three contrasting municipalities is also of considerable interest.
Background
While comparative studies on environmental governance have focused
mostly on Western industrial economies, there has been a growing
interest in researching local environmental enforcement in developing
countries and transition economies (Smith, 2000; Dasgupta, 2000; Stu-
ligrouss, 1999; Tang, Prahash and Tang, 1998; Bluffstone and Larson,
1997). Much of this work has focused on China (e.g., Ross, 1988; Chan,
et al., 1995; Tang et al., 1997; Lo, Yip and Cheung, 2000; Sinkule and
Ortonlano, 1995; Jahiel, 1997; Ma and Ortolano, 2000), where the
conﬂicts between economic development and environmental protection
are often exceptionally pronounced. Studies dealing with enforcement
style dimensions have revealed preliminary ﬁndings indicating that
China’s command and control approach to regulatory enforcement gen-
erally tends to be more formal, discretionary, and non-confrontational
than that of most other countries (Lo et al., 2000). However, it is
important to observe that such generalizations have typically been
drawn from either case studies or other highly delimited samples. As a
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consequence, the notion of a ‘‘national style’’ of enforcement is cur-
rently more an assumption than an empirical conclusion.
In the study of regulatory enforcement dimensions, scholars have
generally focused on the factors that inﬂuence either regulatory agen-
cies or their ofﬁcials (Hawkins, 1984; Yeager, 1993; Kagan, 1994;
Gormley, 1988). Such studies suggest that enforcement agencies tend to
be more strongly inﬂuenced externally (e.g., by regulatory legal design
and political climate), while agency ofﬁcials are susceptible to internal
factors (e.g., leadership, availability of resources, and administrative
control). Beyond these broad generalities, however, a consensus regard-
ing speciﬁcs has been elusive. This deﬁciency would extend not only to
the relationship between inﬂuences and enforcement styles, but also to
such matters as mediating variables, effect sizes, and directionality. For
example, it was found that in the enforcement of CERCLA
(Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980), some US EPA regional ofﬁces have adopted very legalistic
approaches, while others have approached enforcement in a more con-
ciliatory manner (Church and Nakamura, 1993). As external inﬂuences
probably vary by jurisdiction and internal factors by agency, we anticip-
ate ample contextual variation. Moreover, current studies tend to sug-
gest that regional variations in enforcement style may be particularly
great in China.
Enforcement Style Dimensions
A major theme of the regulatory enforcement literature has been to
identify the institutional forces that shape the enforcement style
dimensions of agencies. With the focus on different dimensions of regu-
latory enforcement, these studies have indicated that enforcement style
tends to be multi-dimensional (see Gormley, 1998, in particular). In
the regulatory process, a series of four dimensions can be identiﬁed in
different stages. The ﬁrst one is enforcement pressure on regulatory
agencies in the onset of regulatory enforcement, which refers to external
inﬂuence. There is strong empirical support for the argument that the
regulatory behaviours of enforcement agencies (and their ofﬁcials) may
be inﬂuenced by political leaders and their constituencies (Frank and
Lombness, 1988; Hutter, 1989; Scholz, Twombly and Headrick, 1991;
Wood, 1988; Wood and Waterman, 1991). It follows that external
inﬂuence may have a mixed impact on regulatory outcomes. For
example, Scholz, Twombly and Headrick (1991), in a study of the
inﬂuence of local partisan politics on the local enforcement efforts
undertaken by ﬁeld ofﬁces of the U.S. Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA), found that while local political inﬂuence helps
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to ensure that local ofﬁces of federal agencies are sensitive to differ-
ences in local conditions and preferences, this local political inﬂuence
can also potentially undermine the impartiality and efﬁciency of
enforcement. In a comparative analysis of regulation, Gormley (1997,
1998) ascribed the divergence in regulatory enforcement of child care
regulations in the four states of Colorado, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
and Pennsylvania mostly to variations in local political and administrat-
ive support.
A second dimension refers to prioritization. Researchers in regulatory
enforcement have consistently argued for the importance of setting
priorities in enforcement. This recognizes that such regulations are
often overly inclusive in scope or overly ambitious relative to the
resources appropriated. Some argue for the need to focus on major
categories of violations (Bardach and Kagan, 1982); others argue for
the need to allocate efforts to cases that have a historical record of
violations or to entities with higher risk (Gary and Scholz, 1991; Scholz,
1991, 1994). Implied in this results-oriented approach is the need for
regulatory agencies to prioritize their strategies, such as targeting the
worst offenders, in order to achieve overall, superior results. Here,
agency discretion is sorely needed in conducting prioritization in the
form of selective enforcement. Such priorities are usually set in light
of government preferences, public interests, the environmental per-
formance of enterprises, agency capacity and budget constraints
(Sparrow, 2000; Kagan, 1994: 405).
The third dimension of enforcement style is formalism. In earlier liter-
ature on regulatory enforcement, much of the focus has been on the
legal basis of regulatory control systems. The general view seems to
favour a formal regulatory regime that exhibits a high degree of legal-
ism in enforcement actions. Here, formalism refers to adherence to
rigid legal requirements in regulatory enforcement. Formalism may be
expressed in the implementation deadlines, environmental standards
and levels of penalties, and in the reluctance to consider any cost-
beneﬁt considerations (Hawkins, 1984; Kagan, 1994). Arguments in
favour of formalism are usually couched in terms of reducing discretion-
ary administration in the interests of preventing corruption, enhancing
deterrence, promoting equity or to empower the public (Bardach and
Kagan, 1982; Gunningham, 1987; Langbein, 2002). On the other
hand, a strict legalistic approach can easily be counterproductive should
it arouse hostility or otherwise frustrate cooperation from the regulated
entities (Hawkins, 1984; Frank and Lombness, 1988; Huppes and
Kagan, 1989; Yeager, 1993; Gormley, 1997).
Finally, there is coercion and education, which refers to the agencies’
exercise of regulatory control actions in their interaction with violators.
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The body of literature on comparative regulatory enforcement in West-
ern countries has identiﬁed two contrasting approaches – adversarial
and cooperative – adopted by regulatory agencies in dealing with law-
breakers (Lunqvist, 1980; Badaracco, 1985; Brickman, Jasanoff and
Ilgan, 1985; Vogel, 1986; Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams, 1990;
Richardson, 1992; Weale, 1992; Weale, Pridham, William and Porter,
1996). The adversarial approach stresses the coercion of law mani-
fested in a strong propensity to impose, or signal the imposition of,
sanctions for non-compliance. The advocacy of coercion is usually
grounded in the view that ‘regulated enterprises respond only to the
threat of legal sanctions’ (Kagan, 1994: 386). Prosecution and issuance
of corrective orders to non-compliance enterprises are thus the order
of the day. In comparison, the cooperative approach emphasizes the
educational function of the law, seeing the potential for using ‘‘incent-
ive-based’’ or ‘‘voluntaristic’’ methods to induce environmentally
responsible behavior (Press and Mazmanian, 2000). Research in other
regulatory areas also points out how government agencies can achieve
regulatory compliance by providing private parties with communication
channels and bargaining areas, as in the case of occupational safety, so
that they can overcome collective action dilemmas among themselves
(Scholz and Gray, 1997). Based on these considerations, it is often
argued that regulators can potentially increase compliance by educat-
ing both the regulated and the public about rules and their social bene-
ﬁts (see also May and Winter, 1999). This may be particularly effective
if they work closely with enterprises that are ﬁrst-time violators on
showing them the proper ways to comply (Hawkins, 1984). Although it
was argued that a cooperative style tends to be more effective than an
adversarial style in achieving regulatory compliance (Scholz, 1984;
Ayres and Braithwaite, 1991; Gormley, 1992), more recent empirical
studies suggest that the threat of sanctions may be a pre-condition for
a cooperative approach (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Ayres and
Braithwaite, 1992; Harrison, 1995).
However, these enforcement practices are not mutually exclusive,
and regulatory agencies and their ofﬁcials tend to adopt a combination
of them in achieving compliance in the enforcement process. For
example, comparative studies on environmental governance found that
the regulatory style employed by environmental agencies in the United
States is comparatively more formal, rigid and adversarial under strong
external inﬂuences. On the other hand, the style adopted by those in
Britain and Sweden is relatively informal, discretionary and collaborat-
ive, with less of a tendency to be shaped by external inﬂuences (Hoberg,
1986; Vogel, 1986; Kagan and Alexrad, 2000; Richardson, 1992;
Weale et al., 1996; Kagan, 2001). These variations in regulatory style
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have been attributed to differences in basic constitutional structures,
regime types, and cultures (Weale, O’Riordan, and Kamme, 1991;
Weale, 1992; Weale et al., 1996; Badaracco, 1985; Brickman et al.,
1985; Kelman, 1981; Lundqvist, 1980; Lo and Tang, 1994; Vogel,
1986). Finally, there are no conclusive ﬁndings on which style is more
effective (Shapiro and Rabinowitz, 1997: 720–721). While regulation
studies have provided some evidence to show that less adversarial styles
often are more effective (Wallace, 1995; Scruggs, 1999; Verweij, 2000;
Kagan and Alexrad, 2000), there has been an increasing belief that
more legalistic and coercive dimensions could improve compliance rates
(del Frate and Norberry 1993; Gunningham, Norberry and McKillop,
1992; Darrochi and Harrison, 1999). Generally, while style does appear
to inﬂuence success in institution building, the research provides much
less clarity about the relationship between enforcement style dimen-
sions and actual improvement in environmental quality (Kagan, 1994:
389–390).
The Antecedents of Enforcement Style Dimensions
In contrast to many other environmental professionals, what sets
enforcement ofﬁcials apart is that much of their work occurs in the
ﬁeld, well away from the purview of their superiors. Although they may
be trained in procedures and in how to interact with the regulated, and
although many of the institutional forces are directed at the larger
agency, such ﬁeld work affords them room for ﬂexibility in determining
how best to get their job done within these inﬂuences and constraints
(Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Diver, 1980; Hawkins, 1984; Kagan, 1989;
Sparrow, 2000: 238–254). In particular, ﬂexible enforcement is posit-
ively valued as the craft of responsive regulation.
At the same time, this administrative discretion has given rise to the
apprehension that this induces agency capture and breeds corruption.
Researchers generally hold that the danger that regulators will sym-
pathize with the non-compliant behaviour of enterprises and subscribe
to corrupt acts will increase when they are granted substantial auto-
nomy (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992; Scholz, 1994: 448–543; Sparrow,
2000). Such risks are exceptionally high in China where environmental
agencies are well-known for their ‘‘pro-growth mentality’’ (Chan et al.,
1995) and bureaucratic authorities have been notorious for their cor-
rupt practices (Kwong, 1997; Lo, 1999; Miles, 2000; Huang, 2001).
Managing discretionary enforcement to guard against capture and cor-
ruption has thus emerged as an important topic of administrative con-
trol in the practice of the cooperative approach (Hawkins, 1984). A
progressive solution known as ‘tripartism’ – the enpowerment of public
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interest groups to take part in the regulatory process – was advanced
by Ayers and Braithwaite (1992: 54–100).
Another characteristic of an environmental enforcement ofﬁcial’s job
is that his/her presence in the inspected organization is seldom a wel-
come event. While most site visits may be accepted with a mixture of
tolerance and cooperation, the best outcome for the management of
the enterprise is simply that the enforcement ofﬁcial conducts the
inspection and leaves. When violations are cited, such visits may easily
lead to disagreement, confrontation and frustration (Hartford, 1978;
Hawkins and Thomas, 1984; Kambhu, 1990; Gunningham et al., 1992;
Darrochi, and Harrison, 1999). Indeed, for the businessman, the stakes
in China can be especially high as, more recently, violations have led
to disproportionately high ﬁnes, jail terms and outright closure (Jie,
1994; Du, 2000).
Both of these factors together would suggest that environmental pro-
tection ofﬁcials have ample ﬂexibility to develop individual approaches
to cope with the stress of the job in accordance with their own personal-
ity and preferences. In this study, which attempts to account for some
of the variance in enforcement style dimensions, we will ﬁrst look at
external support for environmental protection. Subsequently, we will
examine organizational factors that provide support or clarity of
purpose.
External Inﬂuences
One set of inﬂuences that will shape preferences among these various
enforcement style dimensions are levels of external support for environ-
mental protection. This is because levels of external support shape the
legitimacy and power of enforcement ofﬁcials in the ﬁeld as they carry
out their work (Hunter and Waterman, 1996; Helland, 1998a, 1998b).
In China, such legitimacy derives from two primary sources – the gov-
ernment and the public.
Government support for environmental protection. Government support is
critical in that it signals priorities, especially with regard to the position
of environmental protection via-a`-vis economic development and access
to resources. In particular, government support for environmental pro-
tection is of paramount important in developing countries where envir-
onmental agencies are weakest (World Bank 1992; Hardoy, Mitlin, and
Satterthwaite, 1992; Bartone, Bernstein, Leitmann and Eigen, 1994;
O’Connor, 1994). A clear mandate for environmental protection that
is also understood by the business community may also provide the
enforcement ofﬁcial with more enforcement style options, especially in
prioritizing major violators. In contrast, an environmental ofﬁcial who
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is lacking in government support would be expected to seek refuge in
a formalistic (i.e., bureaucratic) style, manifested in a strict adherence
to the book or in the generation of meaningless paperwork in the course
of regulatory enforcement – a form of what some authors have called
‘retreatism’ (Kagan, 1978: 94–6, 1994: 388; Braithwaite, 1993). More-
over, to the extent that the environmental ofﬁcial perceives that gov-
ernment is standing behind his enforcement efforts, he or she is less
likely to be swayed by external inﬂuences.
H1a: The enforcement style dimensions of prioritization and education will be positively
related to government support.
H1b: The enforcement style dimensions of formalization, coercion and external inﬂuence
will be negatively related to government support.
Public support for environmental protection. Research ﬁndings on regulatory
enforcement have, in general, suggested that an environmentally vigil-
ant public shapes the enforcement style of a regulatory agency
(Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1983; Scholz and Wei, 1986; Scholz et al.,
1991). Recent surveys indicate that environmental awareness is emer-
ging in China’s urban cities as local residents are increasingly well
informed about pollution problems and environmental degradation (Lo
and Leung, 1998; Xi and Xu, 1998). Although press freedom in China
is constrained regarding most topics with ‘‘political implications’’, the
press has been surprisingly open in reporting on environmental issues
(Friends of Nature, 1998). Moreover, it was found that the press in
coastal cities are relatively more open than in other areas of the coun-
try; for example, local newspapers in Shanghai and Guangzhou (Lo and
Yip, 1999; Lo and Leung, 2000) have been particularly aggressive in
disclosing serious cases of environmental violations. In addition, EPBs
have begun to publish annual reports of their work in an effort to draw
popular attention to pollution problems (Lo and Leung, 2000). Thus,
the degree to which the public is informed about environmental prob-
lems, although uneven, has generally increased, as has the importance
of public support for environmental protection. In a recent survey of
managers in China, Fryxell and Lo (2001) found strong support for
environmental protection and a recognition among most managers that
investments in such technologies will improve economic conditions in
the long run. In this context, environmental protection ofﬁcials will
perceive themselves as being legitimate public servants and as dealing
with managers who have a modicum of appreciation for regulations.
Given this, how is public support likely to inﬂuence enforcement
styles? We would anticipate similar relationships for government sup-
port. For example, with a perception of public support, we would expect
the enforcement ofﬁcial to perceive a greater mandate for action and
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additional ‘‘degrees of freedom’’ in enforcement. This should be mani-
fested in a greater propensity to use the styles of prioritization and
education. The use of more formal, bureaucratic practices or coercive
approaches may also increase when the enforcement ofﬁcial perceives
that it may work in his or her favour (Frank and Lombness, 1988;
Gunningham, 1987). On the other hand, the relationship of public sup-
port on a reliance on external referents as an enforcement style is less
clear (Kagan, 1994: 400–401). This is particularly the case in China
where public support is highly disorganized in the absence of autonom-
ous non-governmental organizations and pressure groups. While it
could be argued, as before, that public support will diminish such inﬂu-
ences, it seems more likely that public support will increase a reliance
on external inﬂuences. This is primarily because the public – as broadly
deﬁned – includes sources of external inﬂuence (i.e., the business com-
munity and green groups). Consequently, such public support may, in
some cases at least, either be granted as the result of such inﬂuence or
with the expectation of it. This leads to the following pair of
hypotheses:
H2a: The enforcement style dimensions of external inﬂuences and education will be
positively related to public support.
H2b: The enforcement style dimension of formalization and coercion will be negatively
related to public support.
The Organizational Inﬂuences on Enforcement Style Dimensions
Although environmental ofﬁcials have ample ﬂexibility in adopting
various enforcement styles while in the ﬁeld, they remain subject to
numerous organizational factors that will also inﬂuence the style
chosen (see Firestone, 2002).
Administrative ambiguity. To the extent that environmental ofﬁcials
perceive that they have insufﬁcient clarity from agency administrators
there will be little consensus on goals within the enforcement unit and
across departments within the agency. This will undermine collabora-
tion and promote isolation and, potentially, increase nonconstructive
political behaviour (Durant, 1984: 311). In such a climate, the enforce-
ment ofﬁcial is likely to seek refuge in bureaucratic rules and guidance
from colleagues or other referent groups (Hawkins, 1984: 57–71). To
the extent that colleagues or other groups are used as ‘‘style
benchmarks’’, the style preference should reﬂect whatever is locally
popular. Whether administrative ambiguity leads to coercive styles is
difﬁcult to anticipate. On the one hand, such ambiguity may promote
insecurity on the part of the enforcement ofﬁcial; however, it is possible
that a less constructive environment within the agency and attendant
Enforcement Styles Among Environmental Protection Ofﬁcials 91
frustrations may ‘‘spill over’’ to inﬂuence the ofﬁcials’ ﬁeld-work.
Administrative clarity – the opposite state – presumably promotes a
style of prioritization. This leads to the following pair of hypotheses:
H3a: The enforcement style dimensions of formalization and external inﬂuence will be
positively related to administrative ambiguity.
H3b: The enforcement style dimensions of prioritization and coercion will be negatively
related to administrative ambiguity.
Procedural ambiguity. In addition, procedural confusion would be
expected to inﬂuence enforcement styles by fostering dimensions that
attempt to cope with a lack of clear rules (Hawkins and Thomas, 1984:
10–11; Kagan, 1994, pp. 394–395). Presumably a lack of clarity on
means for enforcement could lead to increased attention to ends (i.e.,
goals). Although this could lead to prioritization and coercion, this may
not be the case as procedural ambiguity and a lack of consensus on
goals are likely to go hand in hand. Instead it seems more plausible
that efforts to cope with such ambiguity would lead to a greater reliance
on external sources and to frustrate the adoption of a formalistic style
(Kagan, 1994, p. 395).
H4a: The enforcement style dimension of external inﬂuence will be positively related to
procedural ambiguity.
H4b: The enforcement style dimension of formalization and coercion will be negatively
related to procedural ambiguity.
Resource inadequacy. An inadequacy of resources available for enforce-
ment will inﬂuence the choice of enforcement style dimensions by the
imposition of constraints (Kagan, 1994, pp. 494–405; Wood, 1988).
This may be particularly true for a constructive enforcement style such
as education, which implies greater client interaction. In addition,
insufﬁcient resources should lead to greater prioritization, and possibly
coercion, in order to better leverage what resources are available
(Kagan, 1978; Wood, 1988; Gormley, 1997). Thus, it is hypothesized
that:
H5a: The enforcement style dimensions of prioritization and coercion will be positively
related to resource inadequacy.
H5b: The enforcement style dimension of formalization and education will be negatively
related to resource inadequacy.
Supervisory support. Finally, at a more interpersonal level, environ-
mental enforcement ofﬁcials are likely to be inﬂuenced by their direct
superiors (Hawkins, 1984: 51–71; Kagan, 1994, 405–410). As Hawkins
(1984: 51) put it, ‘[e]ach area ofﬁce is recognized to possess a special
character which emanates from the personality and style of the area
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ofﬁcer who presides over it’. Clearly, the extent to which enforcement
ofﬁcials believe that their superiors will back them up should inﬂuence
how they see their job and the risks they may be willing to take. This
is likely to promote prioritization. However, beyond clarifying priorities,
the style preference promoted by supervisory support is likely to be
contingent on a particular style that is favoured by the superior (Kagan,
1994: 407), although Gormley (1997) suggested that regulatory ofﬁ-
cials without easy access to their immediate supervisors tend to take a
more legalistic style. Thus, it would be difﬁcult to predict, a priori, which
particular dimensions are related to supervisory support. This leads to
the following somewhat more tentative hypotheses:
H6a: There is a relationship between enforcement style dimensions and supervisory
support.
H6b: There is a negative relationship between enforcement style dimensions of formaliza-
tion and coercion and supervisory support.
Regional Differences
The literature on environmental regulation suggests that enforcement
style dimensions are shaped as much by the political climate as by
considerations of their effectiveness in pollution control (Kelemen,
2000; Howlett, 2000; Harrison, 1995; Hebert, 1993; Vogel, 1993).
Such institutional factors as concentration of power, national priority,
public participation, court involvement, and the inﬂuence of non-
governmental green groups have been identiﬁed as potential inﬂuences
on a particular enforcement agency’s approach to enforcement
(Kelemen, 2000; Howlett, 2000; Knill, 1998; Vogel, 1993; Richardson,
1992; Weale et al., 1991; Badaracco, 1985). This observation is not
only valid at the national level but has also been empirically supported
as regional differences within a nation contribute to variations in regu-
latory style among individual local jurisdictions (Kagan, 1994; Gorm-
ley, 1998; Kagan and Axelrad, 2000). Gormley (1998), in his recent
study of child care regulations in four federal states, found that regu-
latory agencies and their inspectors have adopted different enforce-
ment approaches because of divergent legal, political and administrat-
ive contexts in these states. Thus, the notion of national style appears
to be an oversimpliﬁcation.
There should be little question that this broad assertion is applicable
in China, where the politics of regulation takes place mainly inside the
local bureaucracy and can be shaped by exceptionally diverse parochial
interests (Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995; Tang et al., 1997; Lo and Leung,
2000; Ma and Ortolano, 2000). For environmental regulation in gen-
eral, at the local level such interests may include: municipal leaders
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(reﬂecting the mayor’s particular policy priorities), various economic
and industrial bureaus (usually favouring economic development over
environmental protection), government bureaus (many owning or
otherwise sponsoring polluting enterprises), and the environmental
agency itself (which must rely almost totally on the collection of fees
from the discharge of pollutants and other local sources to ﬁnance its
operations).
Importantly, although there are formal mechanisms (i.e., meetings)
in which these differences may be aired, more often this inﬂuence is
applied through informal local networks (i.e., guanxi) that often serve
to frustrate strict enforcement (Chan et al., 1995; Lo and Leung, 2000).
This informal process, together with the relatively inferior bureaucratic
status of many local environmental agencies and a shortage of
resources, suggest that environmental enforcement ofﬁcials must be
particularly creative in adopting an enforcement style that is appropri-
ate to their local political, economic and organizational realities.
H7: There will be regional differences in the strength of the relationships between
external support and organizational factors with enforcement style dimensions.
Methodology
A survey methodology was chosen for this study. There were both prac-
tical and research speciﬁc reasons for this choice. The survey methodo-
logy permitted us to obtain a fairly large sample in the anticipation that
some of the effect sizes may be modest, and to reach a large number of
enforcement ofﬁcials in each of the three cities that were chosen. Many
of these ofﬁcials spend a considerable amount of time in the ﬁeld, and
this permitted them to supply information at time that were most con-
venient for them. In addition, it would have been difﬁcult to obtain
primary or secondary archival sources for most of our measures. Prac-
tically speaking, such data are usually either unavailable or difﬁcult to
obtain in China.
Sampling Locations
Our examination of the above hypotheses is based on the study of ofﬁ-
cials in environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) in three Chinese
cities that all serve broader regions. The three cities included in this
study are Guangzhou, Dalian, and Chengdu. In part, these cities were
selected because the authors had contacts in the EPBs (i.e., such that
they endorsed the study). Fortunately, however, these three venues are
sufﬁciently different from each other so as to be more or less represent-
ative of Chinese in the larger sense. Guangzhou is the largest city in
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the Pearl River Delta Region in southern China. It has achieved tre-
mendous economic growth in the past two decades and, as a result, has
suffered from serious pollution problems. Dalian is a coastal city at the
southeastern end of the Liaodong Peninsula in northeastern China. It
is reputed to have achieved signiﬁcant economic growth while main-
taining the status of being a green model city. Chengdu is an inland
city located in the Sichuan Basin in southwestern China. It is known to
have a strong aspiration to economic success, but has suffered from
severe environmental degradation. These three cities represent a wide
diversity of experiences in terms of economic development and environ-
mental conditions. (Table 1)
Data Collection
The three surveys were conducted among ofﬁcials in the municipal
EPBs between April and November 2000. Each survey was adminis-
tered with the endorsement and support of the respective EPB, which
assigned a speciﬁc department to be in charge of the survey. These
enforcement ofﬁcials were from three areas within each EPB: (1) the
administrative sections of the EPB, (2) the associated pollutant dis-
charge supervision and management institutions, and (3) the subordin-
ate district environmental protection bureaus that extend well beyond
the city’s ofﬁcial boundaries.
Responses were obtained from 605 ofﬁcials in the three EPBs and
their district EPBs out of 703 distributed, providing an overall response
rate of 86%. In the case of Dalian, a total of 193 out of 233 ofﬁcials
completed and returned usable questionnaires (83%); in Chengdu, a
total of 210 out of 220 ofﬁcials did so (95%); and in Guangzhou, 202
out of 250 were returned (81%). These response rates are very high
due to the fact that we obtained formal approval for the study and the
endorsement of the EPBs in each city. This, in effect, communicated
to all respondents that participation in this study was expected as part
of their job duties. In addition, it is possible that a strong response rate
could have been the result of having a sample that has previously been
less subjected to surveys than in most Western contexts.
Measurement
Enforcement Style Dimensions. We used a total of 15 items to measure
the ﬁve enforcement styles discussed earlier in the paper. Each item
posed a statement about enforcement, on which the enforcement ofﬁ-
cial indicated their agreement or disagreement on a ﬁve-point, Likert-
type scale. From an exploratory factor analysis, we were able to identify
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TABLE 1 Comparison of Guangzhou, Dalian and Chengdu
Municipality Guangzhou Dalian Chengdu
Dimension
1. Geographical The largest city in the A coastal city at the An inland city in the
location Pearl River Delta Southeast end of Sichuan Basin in
Region of Southern Liaodong Peninsula in Southwest China
China Northeast China
2. Area 7,434.6 km2 12,573 km2 12,300 km2
3. Population 6.5 million 5.2 million 10 million
4. Economic Over 10%/yr. over the Over 10%/yr. over the 10%/yr. over the last
Growth last 2 decades last decade decade
1999: GDP = 206 1999: GDP = 100.3 1999: GDP = 119
billion yuan; economic billion yaun; economic billion RMB; economic
growth, 1998–1999; growth, 1998–1999: growth, 1998–1999:
13.3% 11.2% 8.9%
5. Urban An old city with Transformed from a An historic inland city
Planning ineffective urban heavily polluted in China’s ‘‘western’’
planning industrial city to region with ineffective
become reputed as a urban planning.
‘‘green city’’ in China
through effective urban
planning. Recently
selected by a number of
‘‘Hi-tech’’ Japanese and
Korean ﬁrms for
headquarters.
6. Conditions 1. Serious water 1. Mild air pollution 1. Serious air pollution
of Environment pollution – particularly from the use of coal from the use of coal
bad in the Pearl River. and vehicular and vehicular emission.
2. Serious air pollution emissions. Effective Poor wind dispersion of
from excessive wind dispersion. pollutants.
vehicular emission and 2. Moderate water 2. Serious water
factories. pollution from domestic pollution – especially in
3. Excessive noise from sewage. the Min River.
a large number of 3. Moderate noise from 3. Excessive noise from
construction projects heavy trafﬁc. heavy trafﬁc and
running 24 hrs/day. 4. Less litter than most construction.
Chinese cities. 4. Acid rain.
5. Considered by many
as the most
environmentally
progressive in China.
7. EPD Ranked top 10 Ranked top 5 since Has achieved a top 10
performance nationally between 1988 and has achieved ranking since 1994.
(as assessed by 1988 and 1994; but has the status of an eco-city The highest rank was 6
the State slipped outside of this since 1996.* in 1998.
Environmental ranking since 1995.
Protection
Administration)
8. Similar Characteristic of major Possibly unique in its Characteristic of major
Municipalities cities in the coastal environmental inland cities with
in China areas with strong emphasis. Other cities strong pro-growth
pro-growth orientation in China with good orientation and
(e.g. Beijing, Shanghai, environmental included within the ‘‘Go
Tianjin, Nanjiang). reputations and good West’’ campaign (e.g.,
urban planning include: Lanzhou, Chongqing).
Xiamen, Zhuhai, and
Weihai.
*A total of six cities were awarded the status of a model city in environmental terms in China
at an inaugural event in 1996. This number was increased to 11 in 1998, and these 11 cities
did not compete for ranking in the annual assessment exercise.
This table was compiled by using information from the following government publications:
China Environment Yearbook 1990–1999 (Beijing: China Environment Yearbook Press); Guangzhou
Statistical Yearbook 2000 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2000); Dalian Statistical Yearbook 2000
(Dalian: 2000); and Chengdu Statistical Yearbook 2000 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2000).
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ﬁve factors accounting for 63% of the variance among the items that
corresponded to the anticipated structure. The ﬁfth factor, however,
did not have an eigenvalue greater than 1.0, which raised the question
of whether or not it should be retained. Because this particular factor
spoke to the enforcement style of ‘‘coercion’’ which is of particular
interest in this context, and because items did not appear to cross-load
on other factors, we decided to retain it while recognizing this particu-
lar scale’s limitations. These factor loadings, along with the wording of
the items, are provided in Table 2.
Scales were formed by summing the items, as follows: 1) Five items
formed a scale measuring formalism which emphasized strict and consist-
ent adherence to regulations and procedures (α = .71); 2) Three items
comprised a scale to measure the enforcement style of prioritization,
which emphasized determination of the most important responsibilities
and identiﬁcation of the most important offenders (α = .70); 3) Two
items formed a scale to measure the style of education which spoke to
the education of the public and businesses (α = .84); 4) Three items
formed a scale for external inﬂuence that spoke to how malleable the style
was in complying to the interests of other parties (α = .78); and 5) Two
items that emphasized suspicion and threats formed a scale for the
style of coercion (α = .67).
External and Organizational Support. Although a total of 24
items were used to measure the independent variables in this study: 1)
Eight items formed a scale for government support that inquired about the
level of support from speciﬁc government entitles (i.e., the provincial
government, city government, city party committee). While it was
expected that there would be some differences in support among these
various governmental agencies, all of these items loaded strongly on a
single factor. Thus, it might be concluded that the environmental ofﬁ-
cials saw governments as relatively monolithic in this regard. As a
result, these items were formed into a single scale with a reliability
coefﬁcient of .95; 2) Five items comprised a scale measuring public
support which surveyed support from various groups (e.g., the public at
large, business, mass media, ‘‘green’’ groups). As before, these loaded
strongly on the same factor and were thus aggregated into a scale with
an α of .88; 3) Two items assessed the level of supervisory support by
inquiring whether the respondent perceived that their boss ‘‘respected
and cared’’ about them and provided ‘‘guidance and support’’. This
scale had an α of .86; and, 4) The adequacy of resources to perform
one’s job was measured by a single item that asked if the respondent
‘‘encountered inadequate resources in performing their work’’.
Control variables. Five variables were added as controls in this
study, as each might have spurious inﬂuences on the hypothesized rela-
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tionships, and warranted inclusion in the model: 1) Gender. The sex of
the respondent was dummy coded as ‘‘0’’ for male respondents and ‘‘1’’
for females; 2) Educational Attainment was measured as an ordered,
categorical variable with seven choices ranging from ‘‘1’’ for ‘‘no post-
primary schooling’’ to ‘‘7’’ for some form of postgraduate degree; 3)
Age. The respondents’ current age in years; 4) Environmental Values.
We used a shortened, seven-item version of the ‘‘New Environmental
Paradigm’’ scale (Dunlap and van Liere, 1978). This scale was
shortened primarily because some of the items did not contribute to
the internal consistency of the scale and were dropped. The resulting
scale had an α of .70; and, 5) Belief in Legitimacy of Government. The
degree of the respondents’ belief that government should play an active
role in mitigating environmental problems was measured by ﬁve items
that had an α of .70. Each of these variables was used as controls
because they could inﬂuence the relationship between the support vari-
ables and enforcement styles. This is probably most obvious in the case
of environmental values and the belief in the legitimacy of government;
however, we also thought it prudent to control for age, education and
gender as these variables would likely have a broader inﬂuence on the
favoured enforcement style. A factor analysis of all scales used as inde-
pendent or control variables, along with the wording of the items, is
given in Table 3.
Results
Altogether, four types of results are reported: those for the combined
samples (n = 605); and those for the Guangzhou sample (n = 202), the
Dalian Sample (n = 193); and the Chengdu sample (n = 210). Detailed
correlation matrices are available from the authors. The reported
means among the three samples permit comparisons and highlight dif-
ferences across the samples. Generally, the same general pattern of
preferences was observed across all three samples. ‘‘Prioritization’’ and
‘‘education’’ are the most common style dimensions in each sample,
whereas ‘‘coercion’’ and ‘‘external inﬂuence’’ are much less favoured.
This relatively ‘‘positive’’ approach to environmental enforcement may
reﬂect both the resource limitations of environmental regulatory
enforcement and the relative caution with which environmental ofﬁ-
cials must approach powerful business interests that are often
state-owned.
In also appeared that the Guangzhou sample tends to be relatively
lower on most style dimensions. A one-way ANOVA conﬁrmed that
signiﬁcant differences exist among the three samples for all style
dimensions with the exception of ‘‘coercion’’: Dalian’ ofﬁcials, for
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example, rely more heavily on the style dimension of ‘‘formalization’’
than ofﬁcials in Guangzhou, who rely upon it least; both Chengdu and
Dalian ofﬁcials emphasize the dimensions of ‘‘education’’ and ‘‘priorit-
ization’’ signiﬁcantly more than those in Guangzhou, and enforcement
ofﬁcials in Chengdu are signiﬁcantly more likely to use the style dimen-
sion of ‘‘coordination’’ than their counterparts in the other two regions.
An inspection of the means revealed other differences among the
samples. Some of the more interesting differences including the follow-
ing: enforcement ofﬁcials in Dalian are older, more likely to be male,
espouse stronger environmental values (on the NEP scale), and report
the highest levels of both government and public support. In contrast,
Chengdu ofﬁcials reported signiﬁcantly less educational attainment
and appear to perceive greater obstacles for enforcement.
The estimates for the regression models are reported in Table 4. In
this table the results for each sample are reported in the columns under
each enforcement style dimension. For example, the results for the
regression on the enforcement style dimension of ‘‘education’’ for the
Guangzhou sample (‘‘G’’) are reported in the ﬁrst column. Similarly,
the results for the regression on the dimension of ‘‘prioritization’’ for
the Chengdu sample (‘‘C’’), the Dalian sample (‘‘D’’) and the total
combined sample (‘‘T’’) are reported in the ﬁfth, sixth, and seventh
columns respectively.
The initial impression of these results is one of inconsistency across
the three samples. Although many signiﬁcant relationships are in evid-
ence and the predictive power of the models is reasonably high (in most
cases ranging from 11% to 33% of the variance explained), there is no
single signiﬁcant relationship common to all three samples. This would
appear to generally conﬁrm the potency of local inﬂuences on the selec-
tion of enforcement style dimensions among environmental ofﬁcials in
China and to offer ample support for the seventh hypothesis.
The ﬁrst pair of hypotheses (H1a and H1b) anticipated relationships
between government support and enforcement styles. Such relation-
ships are most evident in the Dalian sample, with such support having
a strong, positive inﬂuence on preferences for the enforcement style
dimensions of ‘‘education’’ and ‘‘prioritization’’, but a negative relation-
ship to ‘‘external inﬂuence’’. In contrast, although a positive relation-
ship between government support and prioritization is found in
Guangzhou, signiﬁcant negative relationships are observed for the
dimensions of ‘‘formalization’’ and ‘‘coercion’’. In Chengdu, govern-
ment support has only negative inﬂuences on ‘‘coercion’’ and ‘‘external
inﬂuence’’. Although this leaves the picture rather confused, it does
seem clear that H1a received mixed support in that government sup-
port seems to have a variable, positive relationship to ‘‘prioritization’’
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(as predicted), but a negative relationship to ‘‘coercion’’ (also as
predicted). Its counterpart, H1b, received somewhat more support in
that ‘‘formalism’’ and ‘‘external inﬂuence’’ are negatively related to
government support (although these relationships are not signiﬁcant
in all samples).
The same general pattern holds for the second through sixth hypo-
theses (i.e., there are some signiﬁcant relationships, but the pattern
of signiﬁcant coefﬁcients is irregular). Given the irregular pattern of
ﬁndings, it becomes rather difﬁcult to draw broad conclusions. One way
forward may be to focus this discussion on relationships that are
common to at least two subsamples (especially those common to
Guangzhou and Chengdu, as they are probably more ‘‘typical’’ of cities
in China, Dalian being the exception by virtue of its ‘‘green’’ reputa-
tion. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the combined, ‘‘total’’ sample will also
be discussed. Employing this approach, we would reiterate that govern-
ment support has a positive inﬂuence on the dimension of ‘‘prioritiz-
ation’’ and a negative inﬂuence on the ‘‘coercion’’ and ‘‘external inﬂu-
ence’’ dimensions. On the other hand, public support appears to have
a somewhat more generally positive inﬂuence on enforcement style
dimensions. Speciﬁcally, public support tends to promote the dimen-
sions of ‘‘education’’ and ‘‘coercion’’ (and, possibly, ‘‘external inﬂuence’’
as well). With the exception of ‘‘formalism’’ (a strong positive relation-
ship in only Guangzhou), this provides a modicum of support for H2a
and H2b.
The inﬂuence of administrative ambiguity on enforcement styles
appears to promote a greater emphasis on ‘‘formalization’’, and
‘‘external inﬂuence’’ (as predicted by H3a), but also with ‘‘coercion’’
(expected to be negative in H3b). Because the administrative support
items dealt with matters of communication and coordination, these
would seem to be enforcement style dimensions that ofﬁcials may adopt
when they lack information about desired objectives and a clear sense
of organizational culture, and are otherwise estranged from the organ-
ization. Thus, H3a is partially supported while H3b is not.
Procedural ambiguity (i.e., unclear, excessive and conﬂicting rules)
appears to have a positive relationship with the style dimensions of
‘‘coercion’’ and ‘‘external inﬂuence’’. As with administrative ambiguity,
we might similarly propose that an absence of clear procedures may
promote styles that are intended to ‘‘get the job done’’ by any means
(i.e., coercion) or seek guidance from external referents. No signiﬁcant
relationships were observed with ‘‘formalism’’. Thus, while H4a is sup-
ported, H4b is clearly not.
Inadequate resources appear to promote the dimensions of ‘‘prioritiz-
ation’’ while suppressing ‘‘coercion’’. While it seems reasonably clear
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why insufﬁcient resources would lead to prioritization (i.e., to better
leverage limited resources to obtain the maximum beneﬁt for the
environment), it is somewhat less obvious why inadequate resources
would be related to coercion. It might be conjectured that insufﬁcient
resources may promote a measure of ‘‘posturing’’ or ‘‘blufﬁng’’ on the
part of enforcement ofﬁcials that underscores the likelihood of sanc-
tions over more resource-intensive options (e.g., education, prioritiz-
ation or formalization). Thus, H5a received mixed support while H5b
is not supported.
Finally, the relationships involving supervisory support are perhaps
the most equivocal among those hypothesized. In the only instance
where two samples have signiﬁcant results (i.e., for the style dimension
of formalization), the results were in opposite directions. Thus, it does
not appear prudent to make more general statements about its inﬂu-
ence and we would conclude that there is no support for either H6a or
H6b.
It should also be noted that some of the control variables also suggest
interesting relationships. 1) Education appears to be negatively related
to the style dimension of ‘‘external inﬂuence’’. Presumably, this is an
indication that more educated ofﬁcials are relatively more conﬁdent in
their styles and are less likely to look toward external inﬂuence; 2)
Older enforcement ofﬁcers were more likely to pursue prioritization
and formalization style dimensions. This suggests that older ofﬁcials
may use their experience to achieve the greatest effect on pollution
reductions (i.e., prioritization) or to know how to ‘‘go by the book’’; 3)
A respondent’s belief in the legitimacy of government actions to protect
the environment appears to be positively related to the style dimensions
of ‘‘education’’ and ‘‘prioritization’’. These ﬁndings conform to the
common sense expectations one would have for enforcement ofﬁcials
with greater convictions regarding a proactive government; and, 4) An
enforcement ofﬁcial’s environmental values as measured by the NEP
scale appear relatively inert, but may have a positive effect on the style
dimension of prioritization.
Discussion
A substantial body of literature exists that examines how enforcement
style dimensions vary in industrialized democratic countries. Our study
makes an initial effort to tackle this research problem in a contrasting
context, a developing, and relatively undemocratic country – China.
The results of this study provide the empirical bases for us to make
some preliminary observations on the ways external and internal fac-
tors inﬂuence enforcement style dimensions in China. A starting point
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is that China’s adoption of a decentralized approach in environmental
governance has encouraged different local strategies, thereby allowing
local institutional factors to play a greater part to shape enforcement
style dimensions while eroding the national character which has been
so pronounced in a communist single-party regime.
In some ways, China is similar to previous ﬁndings in Western con-
texts concerning the inﬂuences of government and public support on
enforcement style dimensions. As regulation theories suggest, external
support and organizational factors do appear to exert an inﬂuence on
an enforcement ofﬁcer’s preferences among enforcement style dimen-
sions. What can be asserted with the greatest conviction, however, is
that the strength and even the directionality of these relationships
appear to be contingent upon political, environmental and organiza-
tional contexts. In this regard, Dalian appears to be the most unique
sample by virtue of being considered among the ‘‘greenest’’ cities in
China, while Chengdu and Guangzhou are probably more typical of
large urban centers with serious environmental problems. Thus, it is
conceivable that ﬁndings common to these latter two cities may be
generalized to similar regions. Probably the ﬁndings for Dalian should
be regarded more as an exceptional ‘‘case study’’. That said, some of
the overall impressions gleaned about the effects of external and
internal inﬂuences will be brieﬂy reviewed and the implications
discussed.
Broadly generalizing, the inﬂuences of government and public sup-
port do appear to be desirable for the effective enforcement of environ-
mental regulations in China. This more normative statement is derived
from the fact that more positive and proactive enforcement style
dimensions, especially ‘‘prioritization’’, may be linked to enforcement
effectiveness (Tang, Lo and Fryxell, 2003). Consequently, one can see
that although the inﬂuence of government support may not be strong
in each sample, when present it positively inﬂuences the dimensions of
‘‘education’’ and ‘‘prioritization’’, which may be particularly more pro-
ductive in securing regulatory compliance.
The same can be said for the inﬂuence of public support on environ-
mental protection. In contrast to government support, public support
appears to encourage environmental results over process by being posit-
ively related to a broader range of enforcement style dimensions. Thus,
government support appears to be more discriminating in terms of how
environmental protection is realized, whereas public support appears
to promote results. It might be suggested, however, that both are gener-
ally compatible and important for effective environmental regulation in
China. Indeed, in most contexts public support would lead to increased
government support for environmental protection. This would also
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appear to be true in modern China as local governments have increas-
ingly become more susceptible to popular inﬂuence in formulating pol-
lution control measures under current political and economic liberaliz-
ing trends. For example, the Deputy Mayor of Guangzhou pointed out
that widespread complaints from the public about degraded air quality
played a considerable part in recent efforts to control vehicle pollution
in a comprehensive manner (Guangzhou Environmental Protection
Bureau, 1997, 59–60).
In contrast, the inﬂuences of organizational factors on enforcement
style dimensions in the Chinese context were relatively inconsistent
and generally not in conformance with generalizations from Western
studies. Regardless, some broad conclusions are possible. Clearly, from
a management perspective, both administrative and procedural ambi-
guities are ill-advised. These general principles appear to be conﬁrmed
in this study since administrative ambiguity, when signiﬁcant, appears
to reinforce the less positive style dimensions. This also appears to
be true of procedural ambiguity. Although it may seem obvious that
environmental enforcement ofﬁcials should have adequate resources to
do their job, it is interesting to observe that they are negatively related
to the dimension of ‘‘coercion’’. We might speculate that enforcement
ofﬁcers tend to resort to more negative approaches when they lack the
resources for more positive approaches.
Supervisory support does not appear to be as inﬂuential as might
have been expected. This could underscore earlier observations that
enforcement ofﬁcials work largely in the ﬁeld and less under the inﬂu-
ence of supervisory preferences than ordinary employees. A ﬁnal point
is related to the ﬁnding that, when enforcement ofﬁcials believe that
government has a legitimate and important role to play in environ-
mental protection, this generally promotes the style dimensions of edu-
cation and prioritization. This also leads to the conclusion that some
care should be given to the recruitment of enforcement ofﬁcers to
ensure that they possess such a conviction.
Because one major theme that emerged from this study was the vari-
ability of the ﬁndings across the three samples, some additional obser-
vations seem appropriate about differences in the samples and the
system of regulatory enforcement in China. This study provides empir-
ical evidence to support a theoretical formulation that regional differ-
ences reﬂected in external and internal factors leads to divergent
enforcement style dimensions in China. Clearly, it must be borne in
mind that China is a large and heterogeneous nation and, in many
ways, this heterogeneity is reinforced in its approach to regulatory
enforcement. This is because municipal EPBs receive most of their per-
sonnel and ﬁnancial resources directly from the municipal government
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(Jahiel, 1998; Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995). Thus, although the EPB is
given policy directives from the state agency (i.e., SEPA), it is overseen
by a municipal environmental policy committee, which is represented
by all major municipal agencies and usually headed by either the mayor
or the deputy mayor.
As a result, municipal EPBs across China may share similar organiza-
tional structures, but do vary considerably in their actual enforcement
practices and priorities. For instance, different localities may determine
by themselves whether they want to ban the use of non-biodegradable
food containers, whether they want to build a larger team to collect
pollution fees, or how they want to tackle vehicular emissions (Sims,
1999; Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995). Such variations have been encour-
aged by China’s decentralized structure of environmental governance,
which gives local authorities the ﬂexibility to formulate environmental
regulations and adopt regulatory measures that meet local needs within
the broad national environmental policy framework (Qu, 1990).
Indeed this greater local autonomy has allowed more room for bur-
eaucratic bargaining between economic bureaus and environmental
agencies concerning the policy preferences of environmental protection
and economic growth. Strong and inﬂuential local government agen-
cies, such as planning commissions, economic commissions, construc-
tion commissions, and industrial and commercial authorities, are
known to be reluctant to endorse and enforce stringent environmental
measures for fear that these might impede economic growth. Under
the strong pro-growth orientation of municipal leaders, the Guangzhou
Environmental Protection Bureau (GEPB), which has widely been per-
ceived to be a political underdog, has actively endeavoured to create a
more favorable context by obtaining more extra-bureaucratic support
for environmental protection. To win the support of the public and local
people’s congress, the GEPB has made substantial efforts to propagate
environmental values, arouse popular concerns concerning local envir-
onmental problems, handle pollution complaints, and convey people’s
grievances about environmental concerns to the municipal government.
Unfortunately, strong bureaucratic resistance to greater involvement
by the public in environmental governance persists inside Guangzhou’s
bureaucracy (Lo and Leung, 2000).
In contrast, blessed with a mayor who espouses a green city vision,
the Dalian Environmental Protection Bureau (DEPB) has found itself
in a superior position to bargain with traditionally powerful government
authorities over the adoption of tougher environmental policies and in
their vigorous enforcement. Adding to its advantage was the presence
of relatively environmentally aware public (State Environmental Pro-
tection Administration, 1998: 22–39). Because of the more favourable
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outcomes achieved from internal political bargaining, the DEPB as a
stronger agency has been able to place more stress on the enforcement
style dimensions of prioritization, formalization, and education. Thus,
in China, there is much more local inﬂuence on environmental enforce-
ment than one might normally expect in a communist unitary political
system, and such local inﬂuence is contextually deﬁned, which produces
diverse impacts on enforcement style dimensions.
Another issue raised by these ﬁndings is the level of analysis. Clearly,
the level of analysis was directed at local enforcement ofﬁcials and
their perceptions. However, looked at another way, each ofﬁcial in a
particular region is tied to a common agency. Consequently, each
enforcement ofﬁcer appears to be subject to common inﬂuences in the
form of a loose organizational culture. Thus, this combination of
between-group cultural, organizational, political, economic and envir-
onmental heterogeneity would easily account for this study’s ﬁndings.
Finally, local variations do not necessarily rule out a national enforce-
ment style in China, as informed by the regulation research. If so, then
what is China’s style of regulation? In generalizing the empirical results
of this study, the Chinese style can best be characterized by a high
degree of formalization with emphasis on prioritization and education.
This is quite consistent with current literature that suggests regulatory
enforcement in a unitary system is less susceptible to external inﬂu-
ences and thus has less of a tendency to depend on coercion than is the
case for a pluralistic political system. In China, public inﬂuence on
environmental enforcement is quite marginal in the absence of effect-
ive venues for popular participation and of powerful independent non-
governmental green groups. The presence of an informal authority
structure manifested in the form of ‘‘guanxi’’ (i.e., a network of quid
pro quo relationships grounded in Chinese cultural values) has made
coercion less desirable than an educational approach. Furthermore,
prioritization is particularly important in regulatory enforcement, as
the Chinese government has constantly confronted the competing
values of environmental protection and economic development in get-
ting the country out of poverty. Finally, formalization is highly desirable
in the reform era since environmental administration by law marked
by strict adherence to rules and regulations has been established as the
guiding principle in regulatory enforcement (Lo, 1992).
Limitations
Because it was limited to enforcement ofﬁcials in three cities, the lim-
ited generalizability of these ﬁndings should be recognized. Indeed, the
ﬁndings underscore the limits of generalizability in China from studies
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that employ a single local or regional sample. Nevertheless, some ﬁnd-
ings common to Chengdu and Guangzhou could with caution be gener-
alized, but should be reinforced with additional research. Second, one-
dimensional biases are a risk in studies that collect all their data using
surveys. While in most cases objective measures are preferable to sub-
jective ones, the measurement of enforcement styles is such that object-
ive measurement is very difﬁcult. Third, we recognize that there may
be other potential biases in the data. In particular, there may be a
form of social desirability bias where the ofﬁcials may have provided
information that they thought was ‘‘appropriate’’. Although it is difﬁ-
cult to gauge how strongly these inﬂuences may have been present, if
strong ‘‘pressures’’ were present we would have expected less variation
among the respondents and more elevated means on particular items
(e.g., government or supervisory support). The fact that such tenden-
cies were not observed, that the survey was anonymous, and that it
involves relationships and comparisons among variables (i.e., rather
than absolute values) would suggest that such biasing inﬂuences would
not have negated our ﬁndings.
Conclusions
In this study of the enforcement style dimensions of environmental
protection ofﬁcials in three fast-growing Chinese cities, it was found
that environmental ofﬁcials in individual regions tend to adopt a sim-
ilar pattern of enforcement style dimensions. Clearly, most enforce-
ment ofﬁcials in China appear to favour the style dimensions of ‘‘prior-
itization’’ and ‘‘education’’ over ‘‘coercion’’. At the same time, this
study found that there were signiﬁcant differences in each sample in
the pattern of inﬂuences on these preferences. Thus, it appears that in
China these style dimensions are shaped by local contextual factors.
With more favourable conditions (i.e., the presence of government and
public support), EPB ofﬁcials in Dalian appear to have gravitated
towards a relatively more formalistic approach. Thus, along with per-
ceptions of greater resources and administrative and procedural clarity,
appears to have also encouraged more aggressive enforcement. In con-
trast, within an institutional setting that is less supportive, such as in
Guangzhou, agencies rely relatively more on the dimensions of ‘‘educa-
tion’’ and ‘‘prioritization’’ in order to obtain compliance. One explana-
tion for this may be that contextual obstacles prevent them from
resorting to formalism. It seems that the politics of guanxi (that is, the
domination of informal relationships) – being so pervasive in China’s
political system – have generally promoted an emphasis on coordination
Carlos W. H. Lo and Gerald E. Fryxell110
and collaboration while discouraging overt coercion in environmental
enforcement across these three cities.
In addition, under China’s authoritarian one-party system, while gov-
ernment support remains the chief determinant of the stylistic proﬁle
of agency ofﬁcials, public support is increasingly becoming a determin-
ing factor. However, considering that Dalian has achieved the best
record of regulatory enforcement (under the major’s unusually green
vision of economic development) we would propose that in today’s
China, the government’s policy priority remains the key institutional
factor for effective environmental enforcement.
A few important ﬁndings have emerged in this study. The ﬁrst one
is that enforcement style dimensions in China tend to be diverse. This
seems to defy the conventional view of a uniform governance style in
this Communist unitary state. The excesses of a top-down approach of
regulatory control in Mao’s era have been substantially mitigated by a
decentralized mode of governance in need of effective market reforms.
We may hence theorize that different styles of local regulation enforce-
ment are encouraged in China’s unitary system as local governments
are granted the autonomy to sort out the policy priorities of economic
development and environmental protection. The second ﬁnding is that
the politics of choice among enforcement style dimensions exists in
China’s established single party regime. The vision of monolithic rule
no longer holds sway, and bureaucratic bargaining has come into play
in an increasingly fragmented political setting. As centralized control
relaxes and becomes less preferable, enforcement dimensions in China
are mainly region-speciﬁc, being shaped by a set of antecedents with
their inﬂuences contextually determined. The third ﬁnding is that
public support has found a way to enter into China’s authoritarian
political arena as an institutional factor shaping agency ofﬁcials’ proﬁle
of regulatory approaches. This, to a certain extent, makes the proposi-
tion that public participation is not a component part of the environ-
mental governance system in China outdated. As local governments
have been more willing to meet local demands under current economic
decentralization, local enforcement styles will be increasingly deter-
mined by public support.
Overall, this research represents an initial, but signiﬁcant, effort to
examine enforcement styles within nations in non-democratic regimes,
an area that has not yet received adequate attention. This research
enriches our understanding of regulatory enforcement by showing how
external support (i.e., public and government) and various organiza-
tional factors inﬂuence the enforcement styles of ofﬁcials. To a signi-
ﬁcant extent, the ﬁndings of this study have shown the limits of the
idea of national styles of regulation and the inadequacies of existing
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studies on comparative environmental governance. Given the ser-
iousness – indeed, the urgency – of environmental degradation with
its global implications, valid insights that can help enhance regulatory
enforcement at the sub-national and local levels are sorely needed.
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